This article attempts to think systematically about what sanctions are deserved for a range of criminal offenses. The offenses considered include both offenses of harm-causing, like murder, and inchoate offenses, like attempts, as well as offenses of negligence and crimes of passion. Unlike other theories of punishment, which tend to focus on justifications for the practice of punishment, or the "why" question, the theory presented here focuses on the amount of punishment, that is, the "how much" question, specifically, "How much punishment, in terms of size and severity, is deserved for a given criminal offense?" The article attempts answer this question for a variety of crimes in a unified, principled manner.
In response to these criticisms, the article presents an alternative to both harm-based and intent-based retributivism. The alternative theory presented is called, largely for lack of a better name, "modal retributivism." The essence of modal retributivism is that under it, the fact that harm results from wrongful conduct is not relevant to the severity of the sanction deserved, as it is under harm-based retributivism, but rather, it is relevant to the sanction's mode as precatory ("should be imposed") or permissive ("may be imposed").
Rather than building the case for modal retributivism from the ground up, this article seeks to take the existing components of retributive thought and reassemble them into a sounder structure. The cogency of the argument against harm-based retributivism and the appeal of modal retributivism will likely be strongest for those who allow reason, as opposed to intuition, a relatively great role in resolving moral issues.
I. Harm-Based Retributivism

A. The Basics
Retributivism is a normative theory of punishment. Its basic tenet is that people should be punished based on what they deserve. 1 Furthermore, the punishment people deserve is not a matter of the actual or predicted consequences of imposing the punishment. As such, retributivism is a nonconsequentialist theory of punishment.
Even though retributivists agree that punishment should be based on desert, they disagree on the proper analysis of desert. The prevalent view-what might be called the "received model"-is that the punishment an actor deserves is a function of (1) the wrongdoing he commits, and (2) his responsibility, or culpability, for that wrongdoing. 2 Among those who hold this view, perhaps the most fundamental point of disagreement is whether the harmful results of actor's wrongful conduct should be deemed part of the wrongdoing and so relevant to desert. To take a well-worn example, imagine that A, intending to kill B, shoots a gun at B's heart. Should the punishment that A deserves depend on whether the bullet strikes and kills B as intended, or misses B due to an unforeseeable gust of wind which blows the bullet off course? Proponents of harm-based retributivism ("HBR") answer yes: Assuming B is shot, A's wrongdoing is properly characterized as killing (or causing the death of) B; he is culpably responsible for that wrong. In the case of the bullet blown off course, the 1 There is no universally accepted definition of retributivism. See, John G. Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (describing nine varieties of retributivism). Some define retributivism strictly, holding that "[a] retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves." MICHAEL S. MOORE, THE MORAL WORTH OF RETRIBUTIVISM IN RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). Others define it more loosely as the belief that "justice in punishment requires the features of a punishment to be shaped by reference to the features of the offense for which it is meted out." Hugo Bedeau, Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, in Justice and Punishment 51, 53 (Jerry Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977).
Draft -4/5/10 −4− Second, retributivism, in particular harm-based retributivism, has a claim to prima facie validity. Retributivism has been criticized for failing to provide a justification for the presumptively problematic practice of inflicting suffering upon fellow community members. Retributivism, it is said, should explain, not simply appeal to, the idea that the guilty deserve to suffer. 7 Yet not all moral claims can be explained in terms of moral principles that are more certain. Sometimes moral bedrock has been hit and there are no more certain principles to appeal to. Rather than quixotically seeking more and more fundamental principles to base a moral claim on, moral inquiry may sensibly begin by examining society's actual well-established moral views and work from there. In this light, harm-based retributivism does well. Empirical research reveals that harm-based retributivism reflects deeply-rooted popular sentiment. 8 Furthermore, the criminal law, society's most explicit statement about the relation between wrongdoing and punishment, largely reflects norms of harmbased retributivism. For example, in all jurisdictions, murder-the offense of unjustifiably and inexcusably taking the life of another-is punished more harshly than consummate offenses defined by lesser harms. 9 As a general matter, consummate offenses are punished more harshly than the corresponding attempted ones. 10 Although other explanations are surely possible, our society and criminal justice system have the look and feel of ones based on HBR. 29, 38 (1996) . See also Cederblom & Spohn, supra, note 5, at 922 (faulting Kantian retributivism on the it fails to explain why wrongdoers should be punished). 8 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 14-28, 181-97 (1995) (reporting empirical studies supporting deeply held view among the community that resulting harm does matter); John H. Mansfield, Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law-A Comment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1964) (concluding that " [t] he notion that there should be a difference in punishment [between unsuccessful attempts and consummate crimes] is deeply rooted in popular conscience"); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and The Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 423 (2003) (discussing studies which indicate people generally base their punishment judgments on harm-based retributivism); Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals, 43 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 1, 4-6 (2009) (summarizing a variety of studies purporting to show public support for retributive justice, especially for morally grave results); but cf., Janine N. Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, J. INT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 463 (2009) (concluding that victims of international human rights crimes may not be as supportive of retributive justice after participating in criminal trials of the accused). 9 The Supreme Court has recently help that the death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for even an offense as serious as child rape. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008) . 10 It has been said that "the consensus of Western legal thought is to punish attempts less severely than consummated offenses." FLETCHER, supra note 2 at 474. See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 375 (3d ed. 2001); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 635 (5th ed. 2004) (most jurisdictions punish attempts less than consummate Draft -4/5/10 −5− Third, on the merits, a strong case has been made for HBR. Michael Moore, for example, has presented a well-reasoned contemporary defense of the doctrine. Moore himself puts little stock in foundationalism-the idea the truth of falsity of HBR is self-evident or that guidance regarding the truth or falsity of HBR can be gleaned by appeal to more abstract, more abstruse, higher-order moral principles. 11 Rather, Moore believes, that a coherence approach in which a range of closely related moral phenomena are examined is the most fruitful way to shed light on the HBR's vadilty. Pursuing this approach, Moore argues that support for HBR is to be found in (a) our intuitive response to cases of wrongdoing that involve, and do not involve, harm, (b) the greater intensity of our virtuous resentment of those who succeed in their wrongful attempts, (c) the greater feelings of guilt we experience when we succeed in causing harm compared to when we fail, (d) our forwardinglooking desire that we not only make the best choice given the facts available, but also that the choice that turns out well, (e) our related understanding that insofar as we are obligated to others, we experience the obligation as an obligation to accomplish, not to merely try. 12 This network of related moral feelings about the significance of consequences, though not logically entailing HBR, are evidence that its appeal is not an anomaly, but is a highly integrated component of our overall moral make-up. If not uncontested, HBR is then at least a vital moral theory.
B. Harm-Based Retributivism Elaborated
Much legal and philosophical scholarship has been devoted to the topic of justifying criminal punishment. This is the "why" question. Why do we punish for violations of the criminal law? To this question, a range of answers, both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist, have been advanced. Relatively little, however, has been written on the "how much" question. 13 How much should a person who violated the criminal law be punished? offenses). The Model Penal Code is arguably the exception that proves the rule. Except for capital offenses, the Model Penal Code punishes attempts at the same level of the consummate offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1). Jurisdictions that have revised their penal codes in light of the Model Penal Code, however, have consistently rejected this aspect of the Code. Furthermore, the Model Penal Code sometimes takes results into account in determining a punishment. Reckless conduct that causes death results in a conviction for manslaughter. Reckless conduct that is harmless results only in a conviction of reckless endangerment, a lesser offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § § 210.(3), 211(2). See also ANTONY DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 116-17 (Oxford University Press 1997) (discussing English practice of imposing higher penalties for attempts than substantive offenses).
Draft -4/5/10 −6− Of course, the two questions are related. There should be as much punishment as needed to satisfy the purpose of punishment. This answer, however, fails to advance the ball. It is empty to say, as retributivists do, that criminals should be punished because they deserve to be and, in answer to the query "How much?" to respond "As much as they deserve." If there was no more content to retributivism than that, it would lack sufficient content to be evaluated. Some independent theory regarding the nature of desert would be needed. Even a more elaborate statement of desert, such as a person deserves to be punished because he is culpably responsible for harming another, would need to be supplemented before it could offer specific sanction recommendations which might be evaluated. If unable to offer such recommendations, a theory might be faulted on practical grounds for being incomplete and otiose and on theoretical grounds for not being subject to challenge as being inconsistent with moral intuition.
In contrast, consider utilitarianism. A utilitarian believes that the right act is the one that maximizes social welfare. 14 In the context of the criminal law, utilitarianism asserts that the correct amount of punishment maximizes social welfare by producing benefits to society, such as decreased criminal activity, that offset the loss to the offender, his family, and others due to his punishment. 15 Of course, because of empirical uncertainties, the correct sanction level for any given offense may not be ascertainable to any degree of precision or certainty. But at least utilitarianism has a claim to be a complete theory of punishment on the ground that if sufficient facts were known, the answer to the question "How much should an actor be punished?" could be had. As a normative theory, it needs no supplementation.
It is not clear how retributivism (the theory that punishment is justified because wrongdoers deserve to suffer) is to be supplemented to meet what might be called the "completeness criterion." distributing punishments-particularly to the criteria for describing how much to penalize convicted offender"). Antony Duff, in the most sustained and sophisticated contemporary analysis of criminal attempts, offers a draft attempt statute and argues that attempts should be punished less than substantive offenses. See DUFF, supra note 10, at 351-54, 398 (1996) . Duff, however, fails to offer any guide to the level at which attempts should be punished relative to substantive offenses Likewise Alexander and Ferzan, in their comprehensive treatment of criminal law based on the meting out of retributive justice, including an extensive discussion of sentencing considerations, fail to suggest any absolute levels of appropriate punishment. ALEXANDER AND FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY (2008). 14 There is a general consensus spanning the harm-based retributivist/intent-based retributivist divide that justice, at a minimum, requires proportionality between the gravity of the wrongdoing and the magnitude of the sanction; 16 the greater the wrongdoing, the greater the sanction. The proportionality principle critically supplements the idea of desert. Can more be said? Proportionality implies some ratio between the amount of wrongdoing magnitude of the sanction. What should the ratio be? 3:1? 1:2? 5:7? 13:11? Or should the ratio be variable, for example, sometimes 5:7 and sometimes 13:11, reflecting a more complicated relation between wrongdoing and sanction? Or might all sanctions within a certain range, say from 2:5 to 6:7, be equally acceptable?
The most common answer given by retributivists is that the ratio of harm to punishment in the case of intentionally caused harms should be 1:1. 17 An extreme version of this position is known as "lex talionis." Lex talionis is a theory of punishment with roots in the Code of Hammurabi and the Old Testament. 18 It is often encapsulated in the phrase "An eye for an eye." According to lex talionis, the wrong done by an actor should be visited on the actor. Put somewhat less paradoxically, 19 the sanction imposed on the wrongdoer should be the same type of disadvantage as that suffered by the victim. Raping the rapist or torturing the torturer, however, are usually considered unacceptable even if they do not violate the rights of the offender. 20 Accordingly, 16 (1986) (arguing that the death penalty is a "congru[ent]" punishment to murder). In the context of developing a theory about the upper limit of just punishment, Lawrence Becker criticizes proportionality as lacking determinacy and insists that "[t]he only acceptable position is the identity of the upper limit of the penalty with the seriousness of the offense." Lawrence Becker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1105 (1992) .
Draft -4/5/10 −8− sounder versions of lex talionis allow for similarity of sanction and wrongdoing on an abstract level that does not entail conduct that is otherwise objectionable. 21 In the case where another is intentionally blinded, for example, the wrongdoer, rather then being blinded, might be made to suffer an equally serious deprivation of stimulus (for example solitary confinement), or more abstractly, a physical impairment (shackles or hard labor), or, even more abstractly, a freedom limitation of some type (lengthy prison term). 22 At whatever level of abstraction the sanction resembles the wrongdoing, however, there remains an equivalence at the most abstract level: severity, or amount, of disadvantage, however instantiated. 23 What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice adopt as its principle and standard? None other than the principle of equality (illustrated by the pointer on the scales of justice), that is, the principle of not treating one side more favorably than the other. Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself. If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself . . . . IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101-02 (John Ladd trans., 1965). Crocker adopts Kant's principle of equality as setting the upper limit of just punishment. See Crocker, supra note 15 (defending "reciprocity" as setting the upper limit of punishment). I believe that harm-based retributivism, when supplemented with the principle of equality, satisfies the requirement of completeness criterion-or at least comes reasonably close. Further theoretical work would remain. Some theory would be needed regarding the level of abstractness at which the sanction would have to mirror the harm. Possibly the theory would be along the lines of "as much as possible given practical limits, X, Y, and Z." Likewise, some theory would be needed to convert harm caused to years of incarceration or other sanction. Such a theory might provide that a given harm and a term of incarceration were equivalent if the offender, the victim, or perhaps a reasonable person, would be indifferent between them. 25 Other questions would remain, for example, if A kills B, does executing A impose a sanction equal to the harm caused, or must A's life be shortened by the (possibly brief) amount of time B's life was shortened? Nevertheless, because we can envision the lines along which questions might be answered, I judge harm-based retributivism supplemented by the equality principle to satisfy the completeness criterion.
II. A Critique of Harm-Based Retributivism
The section presents an argument against harm-based retributivism. The strength and interest of the argument is that it is an internal criticism of HBR. Rather than seeking to dislodge the proponent of HBR from her position based on arguments from premises that for many have less intuitive appeal than HBR itself, the criticism here attempts to show the difficulty inherent in working through the intuitions that underlie HBR. I will try to show that HBR, while perhaps invulnerable from attack by opposing moral intuitions, may be critiqued from what I shall describe as the vantage point of reason.
A. Reason, Intuition and Morality
Moral questions are not questions of empirical science nor mathematics. They cannot be settled by experiment nor proof. Furthermore, argumentation has a limited place. When it comes to moral arguments, it is too easy to admit premises, but deny conclusions when the alleged connection between claims is analogy rather than logic. Rather than experiment, proof or argument, moral decision-making often relies heavily on direct appeal to moral intuitions. Reliance on moral intuitions is especially important when it comes to fundamental issues, such as whether harm-or intent-based retributivism is right. Sadly, moral intuitions are not distinct, clearly labeled psychological entities with special claims to truth or authority. They are just your/my/our feelings about what is sound, decent, sensible, and just. Such feelings are often an immediate emotional reaction to actual or imagined situations in which the issue directly arises or is indirectly implicated. Sometimes we can say no more than "Upon reflection, it feels right/wrong to me." 26 Conceding the importance of moral intuitions, I believe that there is a distinct place in moral decision-making for reason. To return to the question of the proper proportion between harm and punishment, the principle that the wrongdoing and sanction should be equivalent (an-eye-for-an-eye), rather than say the wrongdoing being equivalent to 7/9ths or 9/7th of the sanction, I would describe as being supported by reason rather than moral intuition. Seven-ninths or 9/7ths of an eye for an eye seems unacceptably arbitrary. 27 It does not seem a plausible candidate for a basic feature of morality. The rules of morality should be principled and nonarbitrary. What counts as principled and nonarbitrary is a matter of reason.
Furthermore, I do not believe that the appeal of the equality principle merely derives from unmediated moral reaction or an intuitive sense of justice. Equivalence between wrongdoing and sanction is difficult to precisely calibrate. For example, assume that our considered and settled moral intuition is that 15 year's incarceration is appropriate for a serious instance of kidnapping. What general moral principle does this moral intuition datum support? Given the difficulty of establishing that 15 years is precisely equivalent to the harm caused by the kidnapping, this intuition seems as consistent with the principle that the sanction should be equivalent to 49/50s of the harm as it is with the principle that harm and sanction should be equal. To the extent that the latter seems a more likely true moral principle than the latter, its appeal is not based on a generalization from individual instances of moral reaction (which equally well support very close but distinct principles), but the appeal of an independent principle of reason.
The idea that reason may be a faculty for discovering moral truth, and that moral truths have simple and elegant formulation, not unlike the laws of nature, may strike the reader as discredited Platonism. This article takes no position on the nature of moral truth, whether it exists independent of the human mind, how moral truth claims compare to truth claims about the physical world, or other philosophical issues. Regardless of how these enormously difficult issues are to be resolved, the fact remains that when thinking about questions of justice, we give great deference to considerations of nonarbitrariness, just as we do in others areas. Consider, for example, corrective justice. As retributive justice appears to be the norm that animates criminal law, corrective justice appears to be the norm that animates tort law. Under tort, if P wrongfully causes harm to D, P is liable and D is entitled to damages. But if, for example, P is responsible for D's broken arm, what damages does D deserve? A payment equivalent to 7/9th or 9/7th of the harm suffered? Because pain and suffering cannot be directly translated into dollars and cents, again it makes little sense to claim that the principle that the damages should be equivalent to the harm is simply a generalization of visceral ideas about what is just in specific cases or to approach the question of the proper amount matters'-seems to be about the only argument one can give."). 27 Kant appears to have championed such a position when arguing that that lex talionis is the only principle that can "specify definitely the quality and the quantity of punishment," as "all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1996) (1797).
−11− of damage through intuitions unmediated by the general principle that the amount of compensation should be equivalent to the harm. This principle, as opposed to the principle that a tort victim should receive compensation equivalent to 7/9th or 9/7th of the harm suffered, appeals to reason and seems a candidate for a fundamental principle of justice.
Few this side of Immanuel Kant believe that reason alone can decide moral controversies, such as the perennial debate between harm-and intended-based retributivists. But the arbitrariness of a moral theory can be a strong objection to it as, for example, arbitrariness was a strong objection to the theory that the proportion of harm to sanction should be 7:9. Reason thus not only can supplement moral intuitions at the margins in specific cases, it can, at least sometimes, if not identify the correct moral theory, at least disqualify incorrect ones.
B. The Problem of Attempts
Having hopefully laid the necessary groundwork, I now begin the substantive part of the argument.
The Basic Problem
Consider the following possible objection to harm-based retributivism:
According to the most plausible version of harm-based retributivism, the amount of harm culpably caused should equal the severity of the sanction (however magnitude of harms and sanctions should be measured). According to HBR, what should the sanction be for intended harm that does not result in harm? This is the problem of punishing attempts. Obviously, a sanction equal in severity to the harm intended cannot be the answer since the defining feature of HBR is that harm matters to desert and a sanction of equal severity is what would be imposed had the harm occurred. Alternatively, no sanction at all, though principled, is not an intuitively acceptable position. It does not seem right that a person who tries to cause perhaps a grievous harm should always go scot-free. No HBR proponent has espoused the position that those who attempt to cause harm but "luckily" fail should thereby be free from all punishment. Finally, any sanction between one equal to the harm and no sanctionfor example, a sanction equivalent to 7/9 of the harm intended-seems unacceptably arbitrary. What punishment people deserve in the absence of caused harm seems like a basic question of morality. Yet a 2/9th "failure discount" for cases where no harm is caused simply does not seem like a plausible candidate for a basic principle of morality. Other discounts seem equally arbitrary. 28 HBR is stuck when it comes to punishing attempts.
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Some False Starts
The amount of punishment for an attempt should not be arbitrary. Yet any fixed ratio between the sanction for attempt and the substantive offense seems, from a moral perspective, arbitrary. Accordingly, an attractive approach to fixing the level of sanctions for attempts would be to have the failure discount vary based on some morally relevant feature of the attempt. The criminal justice system might then set that level of punishment for the attempt based on the factor itself or, where it is too difficult to determine the degree to which the factor is present, the level of punishment for the attempt might be set based on some average presents of the factor. Below three arguably morally relevant features of attempts are considered.
a. Proximity to Completeness -Criminal law distinguishes between mere preparation, for which this is not attempt liability, and perpetration, for which there is. Traditionally, common law jurisdictions would subject to attempt liability only those actors who were sufficiently close to completing the offense the intended to commit. 29 Proximity to completeness is arguably morally relevant. Thus, one idea would be for the punishment for attempt to be based on a sliding scale, where the closer the wrongdoing to completion, the greater the sanction. If an actor were half-way to completing an offense that would result in harm H, he might be subject to a sanction of H/2. The problem with this approach it that it is not clear how such an approach might be implemented on a principled basis. What does it mean to be half-way to completing an offense? There seems no plausible metric available for measuring closeness. Miles and hours seem a wholly arbitrary measure of closeness to completion. b. Intensity of Desire -Criminal law also requires that an actor, in order to be liable for an attempt, intend to commit a substantive offense. It seems clear that the moral justification for punishing a person for an attempt is closely tied to the fact that the actor's conduct was intended to harm another. Intent is generally bivalent: one either intends a result or not. Yet in some contexts, it is coherent to speak of degrees of intent. One person may intend to reach a goal more than another in the sense that one actor might have stronger desire to achieve the goal than another actor. A potential theory of punishment for attempts is that the magnitude of the sanction that an actor deserves for an attempt should be a function of the strength of the actor's desire that the attempt succeed-the greater the strength, the greater the deserved punishment. This would allow the actor's punishment to vary with the magnitude of a morally critical feature of the attempt. It is at least plausible that those with a greater commitment to wrongdoing deserve greater punishment. Whatever its appeal, however, the trouble with such an approach is that it does not lead the way to assigning sanctions for punishments in a nonarbitrary way. A and B independently attempt to kill V and fail. Assume that A's desire to kill V is twice B's desire in the sense that A would invest up to one-half is not linked to any general moral theory, nor is it a familiar constant in the moral universe. c. Secondary Harms -A third possible factor for determining the sanction level for attempts might be the "secondary harms" associated with the attempt. The primary harm associated with an offense is the harm that definitionally must occur for the offense to exist, of example, in the case of murder, the death of another person. Even in cases of failed attempts, however, some harm to society is usually harmed to some degree. Sometimes a would-be victim is aware of or learns of the attempt and suffers fear, anxiety or other psychological harm. Sometimes members of the community learn of the attempt and suffer some sort of vicarious emotional harm or they expend resources to protect themselves against similar crimes. Other times other persons are emboldened to act in similar ways. These sorts of harms are secondary ones. The HBR proponent might fasten onto such harms as providing both the moral basis for punishing of failed attempts and the measure of sanction as well. 30 A nonarbitrary theory of the punishment of attempts is that the sanction should be equal in severity to the secondary harm caused.
The difficulty with this theory is that it is far from clear that it justifies punishment levels at anywhere near the level that intuitively is thought proper. Often a failed attempt will result in no or minimal harm to society. Furthermore, even when a secondary harm occurs, it is usually unintended, frequently unforeseen, and sometimes unforeseeable. Accordingly, the actor probably deserves substantially less punishment for causing these harms than if the harms were intended. Thus, looking to these harms as a basis of punishment does not seem to get the HBR proponent where she wants to go.
d. Unfair Advantage -Michael Davis has developed an elaborate theory for determining the just punishment for a criminal offense. 31 Davis's theory focuses not on the harm done by the criminal act, as does lex talionis, but on the unfair advantage the offender secures by engaging in the act. 32 Davis argues that unfair advantage should be understood by reference to a hypothetical market in which licenses to commit crimes were sold to the highest bidder; the price of a license corresponds to the unfair advantage secured by a criminal. Davis argues that his theory yields an answer to the question how should attempts be punished compared to consummate offenses. According to Davis, attempts deserve to be punished at a significant level, yet less than consummate offenses since licenses to commit attempts will bear a lower market price than licenses to commit consummate offenses. 34 Davis's desert theory, however, is only a theory of the ordinal ranking of offenses. 35 Consequently, it cannot be used to determine a general relationship between the absolute severity of punishment for attempts and consummate offenses, the issue under examination here. Furthermore Davis's substantive argument that licenses for attempts will sell at a lower price than licenses for consummate offenses is flawed because it assumes that licenses for consummate offenses are also licenses for attempts and so logically have wider applicability. In fact, all criminal codes contain merger provisions for consummate offenses and attempts. Based on these provisions, attempts and consummate offenses function as nonoverlapping crimes. Essentially, attempts are unsuccessful efforts to commit crimes and completely offenses are successful efforts. A license to engage in a consummate offense would not provide the right to engage in an attempt. Thus, for offenses where failure was more common than success, a license for attempt, being more useful, might command a higher price than one for the consummate offense, implying a higher penalty is deserved. Such a result, however, is wildly out of conformity with actual practice and intuitions.
The Risk Response to the Basic Problem
a. The Basic Idea -One natural move open to harm-based retributivists at this juncture is to look to the riskiness of conduct. The riskiness of conduct might be thought to ground its wrongfulness analogously to the way that the harmfulness of conduct may ground its wrongfulness. 36 Risk, as I shall use the term, is an epistemic concept measuring the subjective likelihood that a harm will occur. 37 It is plausible to think that we have a moral duty not to engage in conduct which we believe risks harming another, and that this duty is violated when such conduct is engaged in, even in cases where the risk does not materialize as harm. For example, one can imagine a hypothetical story of people contracting not to engage in conduct the actor perceives as risking another's interests because, first, such conduct often results in harm and so is not favored, and, second, because risk creating conduct (as opposed to conduct actually resulting in harm) is conduct people can directly control whether they are engaging in or not. Such a hypothetical agreement might be thought to inform our actual moral obligations. 38 Acting inconsistently with such a hypothetical agreement could be considered an instance of wrongdoing, perhaps not severe as actually causing harm, but wrongdoing nonetheless. 34 Id. at 28. 35 Michael Davis, Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What's the Connection?, 12 LAW & PHIL. 133, 140 (1993) . 36 The idea that risk imposition is analogous to harm creation has been explored by Claire Finklestein. Finklestein defends the claim that exposure to risk is itself a harm. Claire Finkelstein, Draft -4/5/10 −15− Once engaging in risky conduct is identified as a wrongdoing, it is but a short step to the position that the severity of the sanction should be a function of the level of the risk and the magnitude of the harm risked. Multiplication of the risk R by the amount of risked harm H seems the simplest and most intuitively appealing way of reckoning the sanction based risk and harm. We frequently multiply likelihood by payoff to assess the value of a course of conduct, for example being indifferent between a .6 chance of a gain in welfare W and a .3 chance of a gain in 2W. 39 Thus, where an actor intends to cause harm H and engages in conduct that the actor believes has a .8 chance of success, the actor might be subjected to a sanction of magnitude .8*H. 40 Rational actors who engage in conduct to achieve some harm (an attempt) believe that the conduct has some chance of success-otherwise they would not engage in it to achieve their end. They also believe the chance is less that 100% of success because they know the future is always contingent and can never be predicted with certainty. Thus, they assess the chances of their success as greater than 0% and less than 100%. If the sanction for trying to cause a harm H through conduct with a subjective likelihood of success R was punished by a sanction of magnitude R*H, attempts would always be punished, and always be punished less than in cases where the intended harm was actually achieved.
Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 973 (2002). According to Finklestein, "agents have a legitimate interest in avoiding unwanted risks." Id. at 966. 37 The idea that risk imposition is analogous to harm creation has been explored by Claire Finklestein. Finklestein defends the claim that exposure to risk is itself a harm. Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 973 (2002). According to Finklestein, "agents have a legitimate interest in avoiding unwanted risks." Id. at 966. 38 Rawls' famous argument for the legitimacy of democratic institutional structures based on their selection behind a "veil of ignorance" is an example of an appeal to hypothetical agreements. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 114 (Oxford University Press 1996) (1651) ("I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner"); PHILLIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT, (Cambridge University Press 1999) (arguing that the theory of social contract is still valid, but that the absence of rebellion against a social contract, not consent of the ruled, is the only legitimacy that such a contract has). 39 See, e.g. Nicolas Gisiger, Risk-Neutral Probabilities Explained (Working Paper, May 30, 2009), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395390. 40 An analogous approach is taken by Crocker. He takes the position that an act can be wrongful by virtue of the objective risk it imposes on society. On this assumption, he argues that an offense creating a risk of 1/n of a concrete harm h imposes a harm of h/n, which sets the upper limit of the punishment that may be justly imposed on the actor. See Crocker, supra note 15, at 1084). Likewise, Alexander and Ferzan advocate discounting expected harm by probability in this manner when calculating deserved punishment. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 282-83.
Although what I shall call the "harm/risk theory of punishment" does not have the simplicity of the original harm theory, it has the virtue of providing a relatively principled, intuitively acceptable answer to the question of what the punishment differential should be between wrongful acts that resulting in harm and those that do not. The differential should strictly depend on the riskiness of the acts that do not produce harm. It also, of course, yields the result, consistent with the standard version of HBR that unsuccessful attempts are punished less than consummate offenses because R*H will be less than H. b. Problems with the Risk Response -Despite its ability to yield specific punishment recommendations, the harm/risk theory sketched above is unsatisfactory. One problem appears in the following, relatively specialized, case. Compare A1 and A2. A1 intends to kill B1, engages in conduct that subjectively has a 100% chance of causing B1's death, and so causes B1's death. A2 intends to kill B2, engages in conduct that subjectively has a 100% chance of causing B2's death, but fails to cause B2's death. Under the harm/risk based theory described above, the sanctions for A1 and A2 would be the same-a sanction equivalent to H. Such a result, however, fails to reflect the core intuition of HBR that results matter. Thus harm/risk-based retributivism does not seem like a consistent elaboration of harm-based retributivism that it was originally sold as.
I do not consider the problem above to be so serious that the harm-based retributivist must reject the harm/risk theory and be left without a theory of punishment for attempts. First, cases where the risk of harm is 100% are rare. It is not clear that it is ever rational to assign a 100% chance to any future event occurring. Second, cases where the risk of harm is perceived as 100% and the harm is not realized are even rarer. In most cases where a person is certain that something will happen, it in fact happens. Perhaps moral intuitions simply break down in such exceptional cases and the lack of a punishment differential between A1 and A2 can be swallowed by the harm-based retributivist as just an isolated exception to his theory.
There is, however, a more general problem for the harm-based retributivist who wishes to look to risk as the basis of a principled theory of punishment for attempts. The flaw is that the theory cannot be consistently elaborated in a way to handle other categories of putatively punishable acts.
For example, what sanction is appropriate in cases of recklessly caused and recklessly risked harm? A harm is recklessly caused when an actor who does not intend to cause the harm knowingly creates a risk of the harm and the risk is realized. 41 A harm is recklessly risked when the risk is not realized. The offense of reckless endangerment is an example of an offense based on recklessly risked harm. 42 Consider these four cases where an actor A engages in conduct that risks causing a harm H (for example, death) to B: In my view, no. In Case 4, A knows of the risk of harm to B that he creates. For example, A drives down a road at a high rate of speed aware that in doing so, there is an R risk that a pedestrian will be killed, but has no desire to kill, and has no purpose in creating the risk. (A would be as happy if there were no one in the area who was endangered by his speeding.) In contrast, in Case 2, A purposely creates the risk to B in hopes the risk will be realized. For example, A drives down the road at a high rate of speed in order to create a risk that B, his enemy, who standing on the sidewalk will be killed. The criminal law frequently treats purpose and knowledge as functionally equivalent states. 43 For example, engaging in conduct with knowledge that another's death will result and engaging in conduct with the purpose that another's death will result are both murder when death in fact results. 44 Treating purpose and knowledge equivalently is sensible because those who act with purpose and those who act with knowledge have a very high degree of responsibility toward their intended goal and known object. They both fully accept what will occur. Furthermore, consistent with the themes of this article, there appears no principled differential in sanction between those who purposely cause harm H and those who knowingly do so. If an actor who intentionally causes harm H should suffer a sanction of H severity, what is the severity of the harm that should be suffered by an actor who merely knows she will cause H? (8/9)*H? (7/8)*H? I have argued that creating risk may be considered a form of wrongdoing analogous to causing harm. If purposely causing harm H and knowingly causing harm H are to be treated the same, then it seems to follow that purposely On one hand, the proponent of HBR seems committed to a greater punishment than R*H in Case 3 because R*H is the sanction in Case 4. The HBR proponent believes that resultant harm is relevant to punishment. On the other hand, a sanction equivalent to H seems counter-intuitive. Case 3 should be punished less harshly than Case 1 because in Case 3, A's culpability with respect to the harm seems much less than in Case 1. The Model Penal Code generally punishes reckless homicide less harshly than intended killing. 46 At common law, premeditated intentional killings are treated as first degree murder and punished more harshly than premeditated ones done with merely the awareness of an unjustifiable risk (depraved heart killings), which are treated as second degree murders. 47 But between R*H of Case 4 and H of Case 1, there seems to be no principled rule for determining the appropriate sanction for Case 3. 45 Alexander and Kerzan reach a similar conclusion in the context of developing a subjectivist theory of punishment. Alexander and Kerzan would punish equally actors who desired to cause a harm and acted in a manner creating a risk and those who merely acted reckless in creating the risk. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 38-39 (2008). A similar argument to the same end can be made by first considering Case 3. As argued above, it seems reasonable that if a person, as in Case 1, intentionally causes a harm, his culpability should be equivalent to a person who knowingly causes a harm. In both cases, their sanction should be equivalent to H. A person who knowingly causes harm is roughly a person who believes there is a 100% chance harm will occur. 48 Robert Nozick famously claimed that desert equals degree of responsibility times harm (D=r*H), where responsibility could range from 0 to 1. 49 The greater the risk created of H, the greater the responsibility for H is realized. Assume, as might be true in Case 3, an actor believes there is a 50% risk that the harm will occur. In that case, the actor's culpability seems half that of the person who believes the harm has 100% chance of occurring. As a general matter, a sanction equivalent to R*H in Case 3 seems just. 50
But what then should the sanction be for Case 4? There's the rub. According to the HBR proponent, the sanction should be less than in Case 3 because of the absence of harm. But there seems no principled way of determining a sanction less than R*H. In particular, the differential applied between Case 1 and Case 2-having the sanction depend on harm producing conduct rather than risk producing conduct-is not available to be applied to Cases 3 and 4 because the sanction in Case 3 already turns on the risk of harm; it is not possible to shift to risk of harm as the basis of punishment in Case 4. It might be suggested that the sanction in Case 4 be (R*R)*H on the ground that the sanction for Case 3 should be R*H and discounting the sanction by R, as done in Case 2, correctly reflects the distinction between cases of harm and no-harm. Such a position, besides implying the surprising identity of punishments in Cases 2 and 3, has questionable appeal. R*H made sense for Case 2 because it reflected the risk of harm that was intentionally imposed on B. R*H made sense in Case 3 because it reflected a lessened responsibility for an actual harm. The natural interpretation of a penalty of R*(R*H) would be for conduct that the actor believes has an R likelihood of creating a risk R. Thus there would be diminished responsibility for creating risk R. But A in Case 4 knows the risk he is imposing, and so should take full responsibility for it. As argued above, R*H seems the appropriate punishment for Case 4. 48 "Knowledge" is often defined in the criminal law as "practical certainty." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2). Because certainty is fairly construed as complete or 100% conviction in the truth of a proposition, a person who is practically certainty believes there is roughly, but not quite, a 100% chance that the proposition is true. 49 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 60 (1974) . 50 Acting with the belief that one's conduct carries a risk of harm thus may have moral significance in two ways. First, where the conduct fails to produce harm, the belief provides a moral basis for characterizing the conduct as a wrongdoing. Second, where the conduct is not intended to produce harm, but does, the belief provides a basis for holding the person responsible for the wrongdoing, now characterized as harm-causing conduct.
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III. An Alternative to Harm-Based Retributivism
To recap: The difficulty with HBR is that although it seems most naturally to suggest a sanction equivalent to H in cases of intentional harm (Case 1), and seems to suggest a principled extension (the harm/risk theory) for the punishment of attempts (Case 2), it does not seem capable of being elaborated in a manner in which the sanctions for unintended realized risks and unintended unrealized risks (Case 3 and Case 4) both are nonarbitrary and respect the difference between harmand no-harm cases in a manner paralleling the difference in sanctions in cases where harm is intended (Cases 1 and 2) . The theory advanced below, modal retributivism, avoids this difficulty while remaining faithful to the intuition underlying HBR that resultant harm matters to desert.
A. Positive and Negative Retributivism
Thus far I have focused on one distinction between types of retributivist theories: harm-based versus intent-based retributivism. Another distinction may be drawn: Positive retributivism and negative retributivism. The negative/positive retributivism distinction and the harm-based/intentbased retributivism distinction are independent. A position on one does not imply a position on the other.
According to positive retributivism, those who engage in culpable wrongdoing should be subjected to a sanction, the magnitude of which is determined by a theory of desert. 51 By this they mean that culpable wrongdoing by an actor is a ground, and provides a reason, for harsh treatment of the actor. While not necessarily mandatory, 52 punishment, where deserved, is precatory. Different positive retributivists may have different views on the strength and nature of the ground or reason. 53 In contrast, according to negative retributivism, those who engage in culpable wrongdoing may be subjected to sanctions up to a level determined by a theory of desert and no more. 54 51 See Eugence Dais, Positive Retributivism and Despicable Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, 107-08 (Wesley Cragg, ed., 1992). 52 A stronger position-one that might be called superpositive retributivism-would assert that in cases of culpable wrongdoing punishment is mandatory, and should be imposed no matter what the cost to society and regardless of how such punishment might conflict with other moral norms. Such a view might require, for example, the sacrifice of innocent lives or significant losses in social welfare necessary to ensure that those who deserve to be punished are. It is doubtful that any contemporary theorist holds such an extreme view. See discussion, infra Part IV. 53 Moore, for example, believes that moral culpability for breaking society's law establishes a (presumably defeasible) moral duty of society to punish. MOORE, supra note 1, at 182. Conditions for desert thus are regarded as necessary, but never sufficient, grounds for punishment. The conditions establish an upper limit of punishment. Often negative retributivism is supplemented by a consequentialist or other theory of punishment that determines when a person who may be punished pursuant to negative retributivism, should be punished. (For purposes of illustration, I shall generally assume a consequentialist supplement to negative retributivism along simple utilitarian lines.) Such an approach combines deontological and consequentialist approaches to punishment and is sometimes called a "mixed" (or "hybrid" 55 ) theory of punishment. A proponent of such a mixed theory might hold that a murderer may be executed by virtue of his culpably causing a death, and, given this, should be executed on the ground that doing so would maximize social utility. 56 Negative retributivism is thus a theory of moral forfeiture according to which culpable wrongdoing results in a limited forfeiture of the right not to be subject to sanctions for other reasons.
The discussion to this point has employed language implying positive retributivism. The difficulty harm-based retributivists have in specifying sanctions for inchoate offenses, however, apply equally to positive and negative harm-based retributivists. Just as positive harm-based retributivists must struggle to specify the magnitude of sanctions that should be applied to those who have committed inchoate offenses, so must negative harm-based retributivists struggle to specify the magnitude of sanctions that may be applied to those who have committed inchoate offenses.
B. Modal Retributivism
In a nutshell, my proposal is that when there is harm, positive retributivism should apply, but where there is no harm, negative retributivism should apply. Because the mode of punishment switches from "should" to "may" based on whether there was harm, the theory of punishment may be described as "modal retributivism." 57 It is summarized in the The initial appeal of modal retributivism lies in the following of its features: It presents a complete theory of punishment in the sense that prescribes the severity of sanction to be applied for consummate and inchoate crimes alike. It distinguishes between cases where harm is caused and where it is not. It does so in a consistent manner, giving the presence or absence of harm the same effect in Case 1/Case 2 as Case 3/Case 4. The distinction it draws between precatory and permissive sanctions is not facially arbitrary in the manner that sanctioning attempts at 7/9 the level of consummate offense would be.
Moving beyond the initial appeal, though, the question is whether the precatory/permissive distinction modal retributivism draws between cases of harm and no-harm is the right distinction. As noted earlier, matters of morality are not susceptible to demonstration by experimentation or proof. Often a valid argument for a moral position is simply a claim that it is plausible and there are no plausible alternatives. I have tried to show that the alternatives to modal retributivism are not plausible. Is it?
Clearly the components of modal retributivism, considered in isolation, are plausible. Positive retributivists would agree that positive retributivism is appropriate in cases where harm is caused. Negative retributivists would agree that negative retributivism is appropriate in cases where harm is not caused. And they would both agree that in cases of harm, the actor, at a minimum, may be sanctioned to a point equivalent to the harm imposed. Here the negative retributivist might explain that punishment is permissible in cases where the intended harm occurs, as in cases where the intended harm fails to occur, because in intending harm, the actor manifests his belief that it is acceptable to use another as a means to an end-at least to a degree. Thus, the actor is not in a position to object to his being used as a means to an end by society to that degree. The actor has voluntarily forfeited his right not to have harsh treatment imposed on him. In such cases, punishment is permissible and, where it advances society's ends, for example the deterrence of crime, it is appropriate. 58 The critical point is whether there is a stronger case for positive retributivism in cases of intended harm than in cases where harm was intended but did not occur. Positive retributivists believe that even in the absence of consequential benefits to society, sanctions should be imposed. 59 At this point, different positive retributivists may tell different stories to support or explain this very basic moral intuition. For example, it may be thought that punishment should be imposed in order to restore in some sense the moral balance of the universe. Where a harm has been done to an innocent victim by a culpable actor, imposing an equally severe harm on the actor culpable for the harm restores the balance. 60 Or, to paraphrase the Golden Rule, as you treat others, so they will treat you.
Colloquially, what goes around should come around. A person should get a taste of his own medicine. Such a story appears much less cogent in cases where no harm has been caused. Consider Case A, where an actor intends to brutally assault a child and does so, and Case B, where an actor acts on his intent to brutally assault a child and the child escapes unharmed. The difference in our reaction is not that we feel as strongly in the two cases that B should be punished, but should be punished less, but, I suggest, that we feel less strongly that B should be punished. The retributive impulse is dampened. The idea of punishment for its own sake, the defining feature of any nonconsequentialist theory, has a much weaker appeal.
Useful comparisons may be drawn between retributive justice and other forms of justice. Where, and only where, an actor actually harms another does the victim deserve to be compensated. 61 Likewise, where and only where an actor has actually created an item through his own labor does the actor deserve possession and control of the item. 62 Likewise, where and only where an actor has actually profited through his wrongful act does the actor deserve to forfeit his unjust enrichment. 63 With respect to both corrective justice, property entitlements, and unjust enrichment, certain consequences of conduct are necessary conditions to trigger precatory claims of desert. Punishment for inchoate offenses, where conduct need not have morally relevant consequences, seems an odd candidate for precatory punishment. In my view, it is the weak sister in the family of conditions to be treated according to justice. In order to be supplemented it, needs some tie to effects in the real 58 See Crocker, supra note 15, at 1072-79 (arguing for negative retributivism as a consequence of the more general principal of reciprocity); Goldman, supra note 46, at 42-58 (forfeiture theory). 59 Dias, supra note 44a. 60 DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 16 (describing punishment as a means of securing "moral balance"). 63 
Id.
Draft -4/5/10 −24− world. That tie, however, is not the effects of past conduct, but to the future socially beneficial effects of punishment. Without these beneficial effects, punishment is not precatory. Rather, punishment is only permitted on the condition that such beneficial effects with occur. This is exactly the theory of modal retributivism.
C. Modal Retributivism and Plato
To my knowledge, no theorist of punishment has taken a position which strictly instantiates modal retributivism. However, modal retributivism is not so far from existing theories as to make it outlandish. A theory of punishment along the lines of modal retributivism can be found, for example, in Plato's discussion of criminal punishment, as elaborated by Peter Westen.
Plato's views on punishment are not deeply theorized by Plato himself. Rather they must be inferred from the penalties he recommends and his brief attendant comments. First, the penalties he recommends are in line with those recommended by modal retributivism. Plato believes those who kill intentionally and unlawfully should be put to death. 64 This is consistent with the principle of equality (lex talionis) component of modal retributivism. Regarding the question whether those who try to kill, and do not, should be put to death, Plato's answer is: they may, it depends. 65 According to Plato, whether they should be or not turns on the relationship of the would-be killer and the intended victim. 66 While in the general case, execution is inappropriate, in cases of patricide and the killing of a master by a slave, execution is appropriate. 67 Thus, Plato's penalty recommendations may be characterized as precatory when there is resultant harm, and permissive (depending on the status of the parties) in cases of attempt. Plato's theory thus tracks modal retributivism.
Second, the rationale behind these recommendations seems a form of modal retributivism. Why, Westen asks, does Plato make these distinctions, first between those who cause harm and those who do not, and second among those do not? 68 According to Plato, the difference in treatment between killers and attempted killers is due to the fact that the sparing of the life of the latter is a "thank-offering" to the deity responsible for the fact no death occurred. 69 Westen interprets Plato as Draft -4/5/10 −25− saying that where an attempt to harm is unsuccessful, society should feel gratefulness and only a muted indignation, and that in this light, a reduced punishment is appropriate. 70 Stated conversely, it is the indignation that society rightly feels when death occurs, along with the offender's personal culpability, that properly motivates society's extracting full punishment. Westen is explicit that in Plato's view, the fact of harm is not related to the desert of the offender, as it would be pursuant to strict modal retributivism. 71 Nevertheless, the critical fact is that harm justifies punishment for nonconsequentialist reasons as in modal retributivism.
In contrast, where there is no death, the status relationship of the parties matter. In the absence of an explanation by Plato, Westen theorizes that where the attempt to kill fails, the actor should be executed either because (1) the act is so heinous that even when the mitigation based on gratitude for survival is taken into account, execution is appropriate, or (2) patricide and slave/master murder are so socially destructive that society's interest in deterrence overrides "the value of the superogatory act of remitting the death penalty in the event of failure." 72 It is this second explanation that interests me. If it is correct, then the significance of death, or harm more generally, is that when it is culpably caused, no further justification is needed; in contrast, where harm is absent, society has no intrinsic reason to act, and consequentialist considerations come into play to determine the level of punishment. This is the defining feature of modal retributivism: where there is harm, noconsequential considerations justify full punishment; where there is no harm, consequential and deontological ones jointly determine the level of punishment.
D. Modal Retributivism Elaborated
The previous sections discussed the operation of modal retributivism in the context of three types of men reas: purpose, knowledge, and risk awareness. The underlying thesis was that it made sense and was possible to produce a deontological theory that, with the appropriate empirical inputs, such as the magnitude of harm and level of subjective risk, prescribed precise punishments across a range of offenses. This section shows how this thesis might be extended to offenses based on heat of passion and negligence.
Crimes of Passion
Voluntary manslaughter is a crime of passion. Loosely speaking, a person commits voluntary manslaughter when he kills another in a sudden state of emotional turmoil in response to adequate provocation. 73 The penalty for voluntary manslaughter is less than that for murder, but generally 70 Westen, supra note 53a, at 318. 71 Id. at 318. Draft -4/5/10 −26− equal to or greater than the penalty for involuntary manslaughter. 74 What should the penalty be for voluntary manslaughter, consistent with the goal of this article to develop a theory of nonarbitrary sanction recommendations? In particular, how should the sanction level compare with the penalty for murder?
Before answering this question, it should be noted that voluntary manslaughter is unique in providing a mitigated sanction for an intentional wrongful act taken in the heat of passion. If an attack results in severe permanent injury, but not death of a victim, the fact that it was committed in the heat of passion is irrelevant to the determination of the sanction range the offender my be exposed to. There seems no principled reason why heat of passion should be relevant in one case, but not the other. The criminal law thus seems internally conflicted regarding whether acting in the heat of passion should be a mitigating factor, at least at the level of offense definition. Commentators, however, have almost all endorsed mitigation for homicide, 75 and so I shall offer an approach to determining the sanction for manslaughter. The approach, in theory, could be extended to other offenses committed in the heat of passion.
There is ongoing controversy whether the penalty discount for manslaughter relative to murder is better understood as a partial justification based on adequate provocation or a partial excuse based on justified emotional turmoil. 76 Justification defenses are appropriate in cases where the wrongdoing is either annulled or off-set by the existence of justifying circumstances. If H is the harm done in a killing, what is harm done in a case of voluntary manslaughter when some of the wrongdoing is either annulled or offset by the partially justifying circumstances of provocation.
(2/3)*H? (3/4)*H? Excuse defenses are appropriate in cases where responsibility for a wrongdoing is diminished. According to the equality principle, in the typical case an actor is maximally responsible where she intended the harm or knew the harm would be caused. Where an actor merely risks causing a harm, his responsibly for the harm is less. I have argued that in such cases, the sanction should reflect this lesser responsibility by being R*H, where R is less than 1. What diminution in responsibility does acting in the heat of passion entail? (2/3)*H? (3/4)*H? Neither a justification approach nor an excuse approach appears to offer a framework for deciding the amount of the discount for killing in the heat of passion. 74 Id. Without attempting to characterize my approach as either justification-based or excuse-based, let me offer the following thoughts on voluntary manslaughter. When one kills another in the heat of passion, one knows that one is killing another person. Neither intense fear, anger, nor jealousy interfere appreciably with an actor's cognitive faculties. Instead, intense fear, anger, jealousy and the like interfere with an actor's emotional faculties. Though he knows that the provoker he is killing is human, the killer acting in the heat of passion does not feel the significance of this. The revulsion, incipient sorrow, guilt, and moral gravity associated with the prospect of killing another is obscured by the overwhelming feelings of fear, anger or jealousy the actor experiences. Potential empathy for the victim is suppressed. Killing when provoked does not feel like the killing of another. On the emotional level, it feels as if one is committing a much less harmful act. Of course, in order for the actor to get the benefit of the manslaughter discount, this distorted feeling must be reasonable under the circumstances. The actor cannot be blamed for his failure to feel as he should, given his wrongdoing. In such circumstances, the sanction that should be imposed on the actor should be equal in magnitude to the harm he (reasonably) feels he is causing, or, in other words, equal in magnitude to the harm of the type that a reasonable person in his position would feel like he is causing. This will vary based on the intensity of the passion that the actor appropriately felt. Thus, the theoretically ideal sanction for manslaughter would be a sliding scale based on the evaluation of a counterfactual about what a reasonable person would feel. 77 The question then arises to what extent is the reasonable person prone to having her normal moral perceptions of the value of others obscured by emotions like fear and anger? Anger and fear sometimes serve a valuable purpose. When we are attacked, for example, they can free us from the squeamishness and second-thoughts that might otherwise interfere with our own self-defense. Furthermore, we have little control over our emotions. 78 It takes great effort and commitment to develop emotional self-control. Finally, living a life that fosters emotional control, for example, the life of a Buddhist monk or a military career, at least risks an unhealthy detachment from the richness of life or a limited emotional capacity for empathy and expression. Just as it has been theorized that reasonable persons take risks to the extent the risks maximize social welfare, 79 so reasonable persons feel emotions like fear and anger, it may be argued, to the extent those emotions maximize social well-being, however conceived. Although this amount cannot practically be determined with any more degree of accuracy than the reasonable level of risk taking, it is theoretically specifiable and implies, as argued above, a principled punishment level for voluntary manslaughter. 77 A similar approach of understanding crimes of passion as involving undiminished culpability for full harms, but full culpability for diminished harms is taken by Cederblom and Spohn. Cederblom & Spohn, supra note 5, at 926. 
Crimes of Negligence
Finally, it may be asked where offenses of negligence, such as negligent homicide or battery, fit into modal retributivism. 80 When it comes to the criminal law, this question is not directly applicable. The central thesis of modal retributivism is that cases where harm is caused should be punished and cases where there is no harm may be punished. Currently, there are no offenses of negligent conduct that do not result in harm. 81 Thus, strictly speaking, the application of modal retributivism to offenses of negligence does not arise.
Nevertheless it may be asked, according to the general approach this article has followed to issues of punishment, what is the appropriate punishment for acts of negligence that cause harm? This article has argued that the sanction for recklessly caused harms should be R*H, where R is the subjective risk of harm and H is the magnitude of harm. It is universally agreed among commentators that negligence is a lesser form of culpability than recklessness, and that therefore acts of negligence that result in a given harm deserve less severe sanctions than reckless acts causing equivalent harm. 82 So if negligence deserves to be punished, some principled amount of punishment between 0 and R*H needs to be found.
With respect to manslaughter, there was wide-spread agreement that killings due to the reasonably inflamed passions of the actor should be punished, though at lesser level than coldblooded or inadequately provoked killings. In contrast, there is substantial debate whether those who 80 Criminal offenses of negligence usually require a higher level of negligence, sometimes referred to as "criminal" or "gross" negligence, than simple or civil negligence. Regardless of degree, the defining feature of criminal negligence offenses is that they do not require awareness of the unacceptable risk created, as do offenses of recklessness. See e.g. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(2)(c)-(d). 81 It is an interesting question why a person who engages in negligent conduct, but luckily fails to cause harm, should escape criminal liability while a person who negligently causes harm, such as death, may be subjected to significant criminal penalties. This is true even in the Model Penal Code which generally established the same level of punishment for consummate offenses and attempts. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05. 82 See, e.g. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 261-62. In contrast, the common law provides some support for the proposition that negligence should be punished equally with intent and recklessness. Under the common law, various defenses, such as self-defense and necessity, are not available if the actor negligently believed the conditions for the defense existed, for example, an actor could not claim self-defense if he negligently believed the victim was threatening him. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, at § 18.01 [E] . The Model Penal Code rejects this approach and treats negligence regarding defense conditions like negligence regarding offense conditions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § § 3.02(2), 3.09(2). Draft -4/5/10 −29− negligently cause harm should be subjected to criminal sanctions at all. 83 Some take the position that there should be no criminal offenses based on negligence. 84 They argue that the moral culpability associated with negligence is not great enough to warrant criminal sanctions. 85 As a normative matter, the argument is that there is an important moral distinction between being lazy, careless, unthinking, and unintelligent and being evil. 86 As a descriptive matter, they might point to the fact that there are no criminal offense of negligent harm to property and that frequently there are no offenses based on the negligent causing of nonfatal injuries. Given that moral intuition supports a lesser sanction for negligently-caused harm, and that there is reasonable disagreement whether the punishment should be at some level less than R*H, and no punishment, I advocate the latter position. The reason is that there seems to be no principled basis for determining the amount of a sanction that lies between R*H and 0. There appears to be neither an attractive fixed point, such as R*H/2 nor a relevant factor that might establish a sliding scale for a criminal sanction. Until a theory is advanced, 87 it seems to make more sense to adopt the position that tort liability for negligently caused harms satisfies the demands of justice. Here, for once, zero punishment seems the appropriate principled criminal sanction.
III. Implementing Modal Retributivism
Assuming modal retributivism and the other sanction schemes recommended herein are found appealing, various changes in existing law would have to be made to implement them. Four such changes are described below.
First, the most obvious change would be equalize the maximum penalties for consummate offenses and attempts. Current law establishes lesser sanction for attempts. Under modal retributivism, a sanction of H or R*H (for offenses of recklessness) may be imposed even in the 83 See e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 141-42. 84 Id. 85 See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at chp. 3 ("[A]cts of clumsiness and stupidity hardly seem the sorts of things for which we wish to hold people criminally liable."); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963) . 86 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at chp. 3 87 Perhaps a theory may be advanced along the following lines: Sometimes persons unreasonably fail to perceive that their conduct creates an unjustifiable risk of harm when there is strong evidence for finding an unjustifiable risk; others do so where there is weaker but still sufficient evidence. The former are arguably more negligent and more culpable. Perhaps there is a means of calibrating the unreasonableness of failing to perceive the risk by assessing the strength of the evidence for the risk and, on this basis, determining, along with the magnitude of the risk and the amount of harm, the appropriate level of sanction. absence of harm depending on whether there is an independent consequentialist justification for the sanction. Assuming that appropriate sanction levels are already in place for consummate offenses, the maximum penalty levels for attempts would have to be raised to those levels.
Implementing such a change directly might not be possible for attempted murder. Although it has never squarely considered the question, it is likely that the Supreme Court would hold that executing an actor for attempted murder would violate the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 88 Thus, under current law, even where an actor A1, like A2, demonstrates through his conduct an utter disregard for the sanctity of life, and, like A2, presents a high probability of killing an innocent person in the future unless executed, A1 may not be executed where he luckily failed to kill his intended victim, despite the fact that A2, who did kill his intended victim, would be executed. Given this constitutional constraint, modal retributivism might recommend as a possible maximum sentence for attempted murder a sanction like life-imprisonment in solitary confinement. Such a sanction is arguably as harsh as the death penalty. 89 Second, minimum penalties for attempts should be lowered to a de minimis amount to allow for cases where there is no independent consequentialist reason to impose a sanction. According to modal retributivism, where an actor has recklessly engaged in conduct or has tried to cause harm, yet no harm has ensued, punishment is merely contingently licensed. In some cases, for example where the actor demonstrates no likelihood of recidivism and punishment will not deter, there will be no independent reason to impose a sanction. Likewise, there may be cases where relatively weak gains in deterrence and other benefits are offset by significant social costs of incarceration. Here no sanction is appropriate. Of course, in many cases of criminal attempts, there will be some harm, such as anxiety and apprehension, caused to the intended victim or to the community. In those cases, some punishment would be called for, at least to the extent the harm was foreseen. Some de minimis punishment would likely be warranted.
By the same token, many offenses that have significant inchoate aspects should have minimum penalties lowered to a de minimis level. By "offenses with significant inchoate aspects," I 88 The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the scope of the death penalty can be found in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). In Kennedy, the Court held that the Constitution forbids execution for child rape. The Court stated therein, "[O]ur holding is that a death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 2651-52. This statement seems ambiguous. It might be read to recognize the constitutional possibility of capital punishment in either cases of (a) child rape where there was an intent to assist in a murder that did not occur, or (b) child rape-plus-murder-by-another where there was an intent to assist in the murder. Under the first interpretation at least some times capital punishment for attempted murder would be constitutional; under the second interpretation, not. Either interpretation, of course, is dicta at best. 89 David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
−31− refer to offenses with maximum penalty levels that cannot be justified in harm-based retributivism terms by appealing to harms required by the offense's definition. An example of such an offense is larceny. In common law based jurisdictions, larceny is frequently defined as "unlawfully taking or carrying away the personal property of another with the intent to permanently deprive the possessor of property." 90 If the property is worth over $500, the minimum penalty for theft is a year incarceration. An actor can commit a larceny by causing only minor interference with the use of an item. Removing an item only for a minute or for a meter satisfies the requirements of larceny. Causing such a fleeting harm could not in itself justify imposing a sanction of a year in jail. Rather than an offense of harm-causing, larceny is better thought of as a specific type of criminal attemptattempting to deprive a person permanently of property. 91 Thus, it should have a penalty range similar to an attempt: from a de minimus penalty to a penalty equivalent to the harm associated with cases where a permanent deprivation was in fact accomplished. Perjury is another crime defined in the inchoate mode. The harm that it seeks to prevent is erroneous verdicts, but it may be committed even if the perjury is not believed, or even a factor contributing to an erroneous verdict. A similar analysis would apply to many other offenses, including burglary and most possessor offenses. Other offenses with significant inchoate aspects, such as rape, 92 should also have minimum penalties lowered.
Third, the negligent causing of death should be treated like the negligent causing of injury, and the negligent causing of property damage. 93 There should be no criminal penalty, rather, liability should be civil only.
Fourth, nonbinding guidelines should be legislatively promulgated. Thus far this discussion has assumed the standard offense definitions and has advocated a range of sanctions wide enough to accommodate those cases satisfying the offense definition. In theory, the offenses themselves could be defined in a manner to more closely track the sanction recommendations of modal retributivism. 90 See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26 1121 (2009). 91 See DUFF, supra note 3, at 128-29 (discussion implicit inchoate offenses). 92 The physical injuries caused by rape are often less severe than in cases of aggravated assault. The very high penalties for rape are thus best justified in retributivist terms by the severe emotional and psychological harm that typically result rape. These emotional and psychological harms, however, are not a required element of rape. Under modal retributivism, in the atypical case where such harm, even though culpably risked, does not occur, punishment should not exceed an amount equal to the actual physical harm caused unless a greater amount can be justified on consequentialist grounds. 93 The Model Penal Code creates no liability for negligent physical injury (unless done with a deadly weapon), or property damage. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(b)). Under common law, there generally was no liability for negligent property damage, and likely no liability for negligently caused physical injury. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at § 21(1)(c), § 16.2(c)(2). Draft -4/5/10 −32− For example, a hypothetical offense of "first degree attempted arson" might be defined as "attempted arson by an actor whose lengthy incarceration would produce a net benefit for society" and carry a penalty equal to that of arson. The difficulty with such an approach, of course, is that jurors are not well positioned to determine whether such consequentialist-related conditions such as being "an actor whose lengthy incarceration would benefit society" are present. Jurors do not have the training or experience to make competent cost-benefit determinations. The alternative that establishes a wide sentencing range of attempt sanctions for judges to choose from, however, cannot be legislatively supplemented to ensure that judges will act consistently with modal retributivism. Recent Supreme Court case law has barred legislatures from establishing sentencing guidelines that set conditions that a judge must find in order to impose an enlarged sanction. 94 A judge, for example, cannot be instructed by the legislature to only impose the maximum sentence where there is a consequentialist justification to do so; the judge must be given discretion to impose it on the ground (contrary to modal retributivism) that the actor's purpose was evil. For this reason, the negative retributivist side of modal retributivism, which asserts that evil purpose is not a reason to impose punishment, is difficult to implement directly through legislation. Nonbinding guidelines, however, are constitutional, and may be used to encourage judges to set sentences along modal retributivist lines. 95
IV. Qualifications and Considerations
A few closing qualifications and considerations are in order.
First, this article has not attempted to defend from the ground up either retributivism or the intuition that resultant harm matters for punishment. These sentiments have wide appeal and have been examined by others. Nor has modal retributivism been advanced as the exclusive determinant of punishment. For example, remorse of the offender, forgiveness of the victim, mercy of the authority establishing the norm transgress, or conflicting principles of justice, may properly bear upon punishment. 96 The last twenty years have seen a flourishing of intriguing nonretributive punishment theories, such as expressivism, atonement, Aristotelean, communicative, and victim vindication theories. 97 These theories might be incorporated into modal retributivism by providing −33− the positive reason for punishment in cases where model retributivism merely licenses punishment. Alternatively, the punishment recommendation of these theories might have to be balanced against those of modal retributivism. Consequentialist considerations, for example, are likely always to be included in the balance to some degree. I know of no contemporary theorist who takes the position that a person must be punished in accordance with his desert no matter what the cost. 98 Most, if pressed, I believe would agree that even a person who culpably killed another without excuse or justification need not be punished if the life of an innocent person could thereby be saved without other cost to society. Likewise, most if pressed, I believe, would agree that even an innocent person might be subjected to criminal sanctions if, for example, the lives of 1,000 people could directly and immediately be saved by it. 99 Accordingly, this article should be viewed as resting on the relatively modest premise that retribution is properly a leading norm in our criminal justice system and presenting, in the form of modal retributivism, the best retributivist theory. 100 Second, strictly speaking, modal retributivism is simply the theory that the culpable causing of a harm provides a reason to punish while culpable acting without causing harm provides merely a licence to punish. The punishment levels recommended in the preceding discussion are not intrinsic features of modal retributivism. They and modal retributivism are jointly motivated by the desideratum that moral truths be principled and nonarbitrary. But modal retributivism can be accepted even if these punishment levels are rejected.
Punishment, 20 CRIM. & JUST. 1 (1996); see also, Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement , 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1801, 1813 (1999); Huigens, supra note 57a, at 97. 98 Certain passages of Kant suggest that he thought that wrongdoers must be punished. According to Kant:
The principle of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its amount by the advantages it promises, in accordance with the Pharisaical saying, "It is better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish." For if justice goes there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797). Compare Bedeau, supra note 1, at 58 (describing as "fanatic" person who ignores all costs of implementing retributivism); see Robinson, supra note 47, at 36-39 (1989) (providing a useful contemporary discussion of the trade-off between desert and utility). 99 Moore, supra note 4, at 719. The view that deontological stricture make be overridden by extreme consequentialist concerns is called threshold deontology. See Moore, supra note 12, at 41 (summarizing literature on topic). 100 Others have advocated a similar position. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 4, at 7-10 (defending "moderate" retributivism).
Draft -4/5/10 −34− Third, even if retributivism or the equality principle is rejected, modal retributivism may be relevant. A wide range of nonconsequentialist theories take harm to be least a factor among those relevant to determining punishment. For example, a theory might recommend that where a harm is intentionally caused, the offender deserves a sanction of sufficient severity to communicate to the offender the wrongness of his conduct. 101 With respect to actors who intentionally cause harm H, the necessary punishment might not be equal to H, but be a function of H, among other variables. With such theories, the issue will always arise what is the appropriate amount of punishment in cases where (a) H was intended but not caused, and (b) H was merely risked but not caused. As with HBR, making punishment a function of H in these cases, despite the fact that H was merely intended or risked, would be inconsistent with the intuition that harm matters, and making punishment a function of R*H, or some other fraction of H, instead of H, would be problematic for the reasons given in Part II(c). The solution to this difficulty would be to make the sanction a function of H, or R*H, respectively, changing the mode of punishment from precatory to permissive. So, for example, under the theory that the purpose of punishment is to communicate to the wrongdoer the nature of her wrongdoing, the difference between wrongful acts that cause harm and those that do not could be reflected by the different mode of the sanction. The offender, who obviously must be given some information about why he is to be subjected to harsh treatment, could be informed if was either because of the harm he culpably caused, or his intent to cause harm plus some consequentialist justification, depending on whether harm was caused. This change in mode of punishment would communicate the significance of wrong done. 102 Likewise, according to a theory in which the purpose of punishment is to assert the moral value of the victim in the face of its denial by the wrongdoer, 103 where there has been no harm to the victim-where there has been no mastery to refute 104 -the license to use the offender for the good of society may sufficiently reaffirm the value of the would-be victim. Accordingly, the approach of modal retributivism may be relevant to a wide range of nonconsequentialist theories of puishment. 101 See DUFF, supra note 3, at 351-53. 102 As a general matter, Duff, a proponent of the communicative theory of punishment provides little guidance regarding levels of punishment for consummate crimes. See id. at 66 ("I do not, I confess, know just how to answer such questions"). In his book on the law of attempts, he merely recommends that they receive a lighter sentence than the consummate offense correlate. Id. at 398. 103 See HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 130 ("The retributive motive for inflicting suffering is to annul or counter the appearance of the wrongdoer's superiority and thus affirm the victim's real value"). 
V. Conclusion
This article began with the widely-held intuition that when it comes to punishment, results matter. It then posed the immediately obvious, but rarely asked, question, "How much do results matter?" In investigating this question, the article assumed that the principles of justice, be they compensatory, distributive, or retributivist, did not contain arbitrary constants or elements. A number of possible approaches to the problem were surveyed and found wanting on the ground they could not generate plausible, nonarbitrary penalty recommendations. Extended consideration was then given to the idea that where a person acts culpably, but there is no harm caused, the amount of punishment deserved should be calculated based on harm risked. The idea of punishing based on risk, however, was shown flawed because it could not be extended to a range of offenses, such as reckless endangerment, while remaining faithful to the intuition that results matters.
In light of these difficulties, modal retributivism was advanced. According to it, the fact that harm results from wrongful conduct is not relevant to the harshness of the sanction deserved, as it is under traditional harm-based retributivism, but rather, it is relevant to the sanction's mode as precatory ("should be imposed") or permissive ("may be imposed"). Allowing harm to determine the mode of punishment, rather than the amount, permitted harm to play a principled role in determining punishment, as well as offering a reasonable compromise between the claims of positive and negative retributivism. Finally, going beyond modal retributivism, this article sketched a principled approach to punishment for crimes of passion, as well as rejecting punishment for crimes of negligence on the ground that a principled approach to them was not possible.
Even on the assumption that there are moral truths and principles of justice, establishing them is no easy matter. Emotions and intuitions are our primary guides. But where emotions and intuitions are weak, ambiguous, vague or indeterminate, reason can play a significant role in showing the way to moral truth, or at the very least, developing and delimiting a range of potential theories of justice that then might be evaluated for moral appeal. By introducing modal retributivism and highlighting its merits, this article hopefully has proven useful in this regard.
